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AIM

4/3/14

1−1−11

Navigation Aids

(a) Category I.

Decision Height (DH)

200 feet and Runway Visual Range (RVR) 2,400 feet

(with touchdown zone and centerline lighting, RVR

1,800 feet), or (with Autopilot or FD or HUD, RVR

1,800 feet);

(b) Special Authorization Category I.

DH 150 feet and Runway Visual Range (RVR) 1,400

feet, HUD to DH;

(c) Category II.

DH 100 feet and RVR 1,200

feet (with autoland or HUD to touchdown and noted

on authorization, RVR 1,000 feet);

(d) Special Authorization Category II with

Reduced Lighting.

DH 100 feet and RVR 1,200 feet

with autoland or HUD to touchdown and noted on

authorization (touchdown zone, centerline lighting,

and ALSF−2 are not required);

(e) Category IIIa.

No DH or DH below 100

feet and RVR not less than 700 feet;

(f) Category IIIb.

No DH or DH below 50

feet and RVR less than 700 feet but not less than 150

feet; and

(g) Category IIIc.

No DH and no RVR

limitation.

NOTE

Special authorization and equipment required for
Categories II and III.

j. Inoperative ILS Components

1. Inoperative localizer.

When the localizer

fails, an ILS approach is not authorized.

2. Inoperative glide slope.

When the glide

slope fails, the ILS reverts to a nonprecision localizer

approach.

REFERENCE

See the inoperative component table in the U.S. Government Terminal
Procedures Publication (TPP), for adjustments to minimums due to
inoperative airborne or ground system equipment.

k. ILS Course Distortion

1.

All pilots should be aware that disturbances to

ILS localizer and glide slope courses may occur when

surface vehicles or aircraft are operated near the

localizer or glide slope antennas. Most ILS

installations are subject to signal interference by

either surface vehicles, aircraft or both. ILS

CRITICAL AREAS are established near each

localizer and glide slope antenna.

2.

ATC issues control instructions to avoid

interfering operations within ILS critical areas at

controlled airports during the hours the Airport

Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) is in operation as

follows:

(a) Weather Conditions.

Less than ceiling

800 feet and/or visibility 2 miles.

(1) Localizer Critical Area.

Except for

aircraft that land, exit a runway, depart or miss

approach, vehicles and aircraft are not authorized in

or over the critical area when an arriving aircraft is

between the ILS final approach fix and the airport.

Additionally, when the ceiling is less than 200 feet

and/or the visibility is RVR 2,000 or less, vehicle and

aircraft operations in or over the area are not

authorized when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS

MM.

(2) Glide Slope Critical Area.

Vehicles

and aircraft are not authorized in the area when an

arriving aircraft is between the ILS final approach fix

and the airport unless the aircraft has reported the

airport in sight and is circling or side stepping to land

on a runway other than the ILS runway.

(b) Weather Conditions.

At or above ceil-

ing 800 feet and/or visibility 2 miles.

(1)

No critical area protective action is

provided under these conditions.

(2)

A flight crew, under these conditions,

should advise the tower that it will conduct an

AUTOLAND or COUPLED approach to ensure that

the ILS critical areas are protected when the aircraft

is inside the ILS MM.

EXAMPLE

Glide slope signal not protected.

3.

Aircraft holding below 5,000 feet between

the outer marker and the airport may cause localizer

signal variations for aircraft conducting the ILS

approach. Accordingly, such holding is not author-

ized when weather or visibility conditions are less

than ceiling 800 feet and/or visibility 2 miles.

4.

Pilots are cautioned that vehicular traffic not

subject to ATC may cause momentary deviation to

ILS course or glide slope signals. Also, critical areas

are not protected at uncontrolled airports or at airports

with an operating control tower when weather or

visibility conditions are above those requiring

protective measures. Aircraft conducting coupled or

autoland operations should be especially alert in

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